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THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS DILEMMA—
WHOSE RIGHT PREVAILS
Meg Penrose *
I. INTRODUCTION—THE MORE THINGS CHANGE
Stop me if you’ve heard this story. A couple lives in a state with a
broad public accommodations law that protects them in the “full and equal
use and enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges and advantages of
any establishment which offers personal or professional services to
members of the public.” 1 While preparing for their wedding, they locate
what they believe is the perfect setting: the All Faiths Wedding Chapel.
The All Faiths Wedding Chapel is a wedding venue that does not perform
religious or worship services. It is not listed in the phone book as a church
and is the only wedding chapel listed in the city’s yellow pages.
The couple contacts the owner, a Baptist minister. After learning
about their proposed union, he refuses to perform the ceremony. Similar
unions have been permitted at All Faiths Chapel provided a judge or other
minister performs the ceremony. But defendant will not perform this
marriage. The minister explains that this marriage violates his sincerely
held religious beliefs. He asserts thirty Biblical references in defense of
his position. The couple, disappointed, contacts the state authorities.
Defendant is criminally charged with a civil rights violation, a class A
misdemeanor.
The story likely sounds familiar. It is a story that has been repeated
over and over since the Supreme Court decided that same-sex couples
have a legal right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges. 2 But this story isn’t
what you think. Despite having a decidedly modern sound, this story took
*
Professor, Texas A&M School of Law. Professor Penrose thanks Tracy Thomas and all the
participants of the Center for Constitutional Law’s 2022 Symposium.
1. KANSAS S TAT. ANN. § 21-4003 (1985), cited in Kansas v. Barclay, 708 P.2d 972, 973 (Kan.
1985).
2. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

39

40

C ONLAW NOW

[13:39

place in 1985–long before same-sex couples had a legal right to marry. 3
This 1985 Kansas Supreme Court case involved an interracial couple that,
since the 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia, had the constitutional right to
marry. 4 Despite this legal right, the couple was turned away from the
chapel based on religious liberty. The case, Kansas v. Barclay, is a
reminder that religious liberty has been used to circumvent public
accommodations law before. 5 And, like some of the modern stories
involving same-sex couples, the minister’s religious freedom to refuse to
perform the wedding won the day. Religious liberty, in this instance,
overcame the interracial couple’s right to equally access goods and
services in Kansas.
So what can we learn from Kansas v. Barclay in relation to same-sex
couples? What are the similarities to gay and lesbian couples that find the
perfect wedding venue only to be turned away? What happens when a
gay couple is told a baker won’t create their wedding cake, 6 a florist won’t
arrange their wedding flowers, 7 and a photographer8 will not memorialize
their wedding ceremony? This short essay gives a brief history of
religious liberty-based objections to public accommodations law
promoting societal integration and provides a potential solution. To be
clear, this author does not see race and sexual orientation as identical. We
can learn certain things from race discrimination cases–not the least of
which is the continued resistance to full racial integration and equality. 9
That is not to say that every incident of discrimination is the same. Race
3. 708 P.2d 972 (Kan. 1985).
4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. Barclay, 708 P.2d at 976. The Kansas Supreme Court wrote that “[r]efusal of a minister,
personally to perform a marriage, is not a life-threatening situation which might compel a court’s
intervention in what is otherwise a ‘hands off’ constitutionally protected area.” Id. In other words,
securing a particular minister to perform one’s wedding is not sufficiently important to displace the
minister’s First Amendment rights.
6. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm., 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018).
The baker, who successfully challenged the Colorado Civil Rights Commission decision against his
bakery, has been sued again for a new violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. That suit
remains pending with initial motions resolved at the federal district court level. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, 445 F. Supp.3d 1226 (D. Colo. 2019).
7. Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2884
(2021); Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), cert. granted, and judgment
vacated in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Gorsuch would have granted the 2021 Petition for Certiorari.
8. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1787 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (analyzing whether a
religious institution’s policy of expelling students that engage in, advocate, or “espouse, promote or
encourage others” to “date outside their own race” excludes the institution from receiving a charitable
tax exemption).
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discrimination has a long, and painful history in this country. Racial
discrimination, particularly in relation to intimate relationships, also
carried criminal penalties that many LGBTQ individuals have never
faced. 10 And race discrimination is a legally protected, suspect
classification with federal statutory protection not yet afforded to LGBTQ
individuals. 11 There are parallels. But differences remain.

Public
Accomodations
Laws

LGBTQ
Equality

Religious
Liberty

II. THE E VOLUTION OF RACIAL E QUALITY IN CASE LAW
Most Americans likely can cite at least two Supreme Court cases–
Roe v. Wade 12 and Brown v. Board of Education. 13 Brown marked a
critical turning point in racial equality that began with President Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation and the South’s defeat on the Civil War
battlefield. While the South lost the war, many southern states continued
to seek legal ways to diminish the rights of Black Americans. Freedom
had come—full citizenship had not. The post-war South outlawed many
instances of basic citizenship and placed freed slaves in vulnerable
10. See Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). While the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), found no constitutionally protected right to engage in homosexual sodomy, that position was
short-lived. And, importantly, very few people were ever criminally charged or prosecuted under
these laws. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 5599 (2003) (overturning Bowers).
11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Classifications
currently receiving statutory protection include “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. at §
2000e-2.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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positions regarding housing, access to public services, voting, and
education. The sustained discrimination resulted in the passage of the
Civil War Amendments, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments.
The Fourteenth Amendment quickly became the most potent method
of challenging what became known as the Jim Crow laws. One of the first
challenges to these laws occurred in 1873 in the Slaughter-House Cases. 14
White butchers in Louisiana challenged that Louisiana’s decision to
monopolize slaughterhouses in the state violated their Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Thirteenth Amendment claim was
easily disposed of. The butchers had never been slaves. The Fourteenth
Amendment claims, though more complex, were also decided against the
butchers. The Court, in what was a nearly contemporaneous analysis of
the Equal Protection Clause, openly doubted whether the Equal Protection
Clause would be directed toward anything other than racial
discrimination. 15 The Equal Protection Clause has, however, been
expanded and now protects racial, religious, and gender minorities, among
others.
The Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, did not fulfill the
promise of “equal protection.” Congress realized this. In response,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This Act was likely the first
modern public accommodations law. Section 1 provided: “That all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and
other places of public amusement. . . .” 16 Section 2 made violation of the
Act a misdemeanor subject to a $500 fine. 17 The Act operated directly on
individuals. Its promise was short-lived. In the Civil Rights Cases, the
Supreme Court struck down Sections 1 and 2 of Act because the
Fourteenth Amendment operates only against states and state actors, not
individuals. 18 The decision is legally sound. The Constitution does not
apply directly to individuals. But the Court placed important dicta
presaging the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court indicated that while the
1875 Act was constitutionally invalid, there was nothing limiting
14. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
15. Id. at 81.
16. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 11 (noting “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment”). The Court explained that “[p]ositive rights and privileges are
undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, but they are secured by way of prohibition
against State laws and State proceedings. . . .” Id.
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Congress from passing such legislation through one of its enumerated
powers, such as the Interstate Commerce Clause. 19
This advice lay dormant until Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Title II of the Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, ensures that
“[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of
any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” The Act defined places
of public accommodation broadly, including inns, hotels, and motels (with
an exception for places with no more than 5 rooms if occupied by the
business owner as her residence), restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, and
facilities engaged in selling food “for consumption on the premises,” and
most places of amusement (such as theaters, concert halls, and sports
arenas). 20 The Act extended to “any establishment” physically located
within the premises of any covered establishment. 21
Much like the 1875 Act, this Act was immediately challenged by
business owners who sought to avoid its application. And, as strange as it
sounds, the route to racial integration in private businesses was achieved
via the Interstate Commerce Clause—not the Fourteenth Amendment. 22
The Supreme Court reiterated that the Court had “held time and again that
[Congress’s interstate commerce] power extends to activities of retail
establishments, including restaurants, which directly or indirectly burden
or obstruct interstate commerce.” 23 These cases overcame property
rights 24 and religious liberty objections. 25 Much like the cases brought
today in same-sex marriage cases, business owners opposed to serving all
Americans raised religious liberty objections to the public
accommodations laws forcing them to do so. 26 These objections were
struck down at the trial court level because the court refused to accept that
“sacred religious beliefs” would allow one to decline service to racial
19. Id. at 18.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
21. Id.
22. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
23. McClung, 379 U.S. at 302.
24. The Heart of Atlanta Motel challenged the law under the Fifth Amendment (as an improper
taking of property without just compensation) and the Thirteenth Amendment. Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 244.
25. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 377 F.2d 433, 438 (4th Cr. 1967) (noting that
“defendants’ contention that the Act was invalid because ‘it contravenes the will of God’ and
constitutes an interference with the ‘free exercise of Defendant’s religion,’” had been foreclosed by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Katzenbach v. McClung).
26. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S.C. 1966).
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minorities. 27 This finding was upheld at the Supreme Court when the
Court affirmed the attorney’s fees award against Piggie Park.
Remarkably, and in a tone not likely to be seen today, the Supreme Court
explicitly noted that these religious liberty objections were “patently
frivolous.” 28
We know that federal public accommodations law are (1)
constitutional, and (2) do not violate an individual or business’s religious
liberty. But these laws do not include LGBTQ protections. So what
lessons can we take from the race discrimination cases, if any? What can
be gleaned from federal public accommodations law? Modern challenges
stem exclusively from state public accommodations laws inclusive of
LGBTQ protection. Is this a distinction with a legal difference—adding
LGBTQ individuals raises religious claims that were denied in all other
categories?
As we think about these modern challenges, there are still some
similarities worth noting. First, separate but equal was never a good
approach, certainly not on a human level. As Chief Justice Warren
explained, separate facilities are inherently unequal. 29 The very act of
separation—being asked to sit in the “other” cable car, being told to use
the “other” fountain, being told to stay at the “other” hotel—carries a
dignity injury that lingers well past the initial denial of services. Being
treated as “other” is itself an injury. Modern advice that same-sex couples
simply use the “other” baker, “other” florist, and “other” photographer
carries a dignity injury that has a familiar ring. Why is it acceptable for
public-facing businesses to treat LGBTQ couples as “other”? The
purpose of public accommodations laws was to stop these dignity injuries
and require that public-facing businesses serve the public without
discrimination. A society that allows businesses to refuse service to
individuals that seek products regresses to a time where the law permitted
“other” bathrooms and “other” wedding chapels. We cannot afford to go
backwards, even when faced with a new minority group that is repeatedly
met with religious liberty objections.
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION—CLARIFYING WHAT IS TRULY RELIGIOUS
In the clash between same-sex marital rights and religious liberty
objections, whose right prevails? And how can courts resolve the issue
without causing dignity injuries to same-sex couples or minimizing the
27. Id. at 945.
28. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402n.5.
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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religious liberty of business owners? This brief essay certainly cannot
resolve the issue. But it does propose a potential solution. Courts should
protect religious services and activities—not secular services and
activities. The status (religious or secular) of the person providing services
should be irrelevant. The focus of public accommodations laws, and legal
challenges to these laws, should be on the nature of the services
provided. 30
An approach enveloping religious services or activities, but not
secular services and products, is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. 31 In the Kansas v. Barclay case, the Baptist minister refused to
perform a religious service. He was unwilling, in his ministerial capacity,
to join an interracial couple in what he believed to be a sacred union. This
approach, while troubling, allowed the couple to have a minister preside
over their wedding at the All Faiths Chapel. The minister even sought to
help the couple find an alternate officiant. The couple was treated at
“other.” But this particular marriage service involved the minister’s
religious role, not his commercial role as business owner. He was still
willing to allow the couple to use his facilities. As unsettling as these
restrictions are, there is legal clarity in separating the truly religious
service from a standard business transaction. One solution to the clash of
rights is for courts to clearly separate religious services from secular
services.
Under this approach, the Barclay case remains a valid application of
public accommodations laws. In the clash between a minister asked to
perform a religious ceremony that violates his religious faith and a couple
seeking to force the minister to violate his theology, the religious nature
of the ceremony trumps the generally applicable law. This may be a
disquieting solution to some. The value is clarity. Those activities that are,
in fact, religious should find refuge in the First Amendment. But this
would mean that deserving couples that have a legal right to marry may
be turned away from those asked to perform the religious ceremony of
marriage. 32
30. An important statutory exception that protects religious institutions in hiring decisions
remains intact. It should. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (exempting employees of religious entities from
Title VII hiring decisions).
31. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 166 (1879) (“Laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices”).
32. The religious nature of a marriage ceremony should not be conflated with the state’s civil
recognition of marriage. State employees cannot legally prevent a couple from marrying, even if that
employee disapproves of the marriage based on their sincerely held religious beliefs. See Ermold v.
Davis, 936 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020). Justices Thomas and Alito
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This solution also mirrors the Supreme Court’s ministerial exception
that allows religious organizations to select its own ministers without
application of employment discrimination laws. 33 The ministerial
exception is exactly what it sounds like—an exception from judicial
scrutiny for those performing ministerial functions or “vital religious
duties.” 34 In many ways, the Court has already begun demarcating the
lines between religious activities and secular activities. For those religious
actors performing religious activities, the First Amendment provides
strong protection. And it should. But for religious actors performing
secular functions, the First Amendment treats the secular activity the same
regardless of the person’s status. As the Court noted in 2020, “religious
institutions do not enjoy a general immunity from secular laws.” 35 For
example, a priest is subject to speeding laws just like you and me. The fact
that he may be in a hurry to get to a religious ceremony will not exempt
him from generally applicable laws regarding secular activities, here,
driving.
The Supreme Court has often carved out bright line tests to aid
society in anticipating their legal obligations. The increasing tension
between LGBTQ individuals and those providing secular services keeps
appearing before the Court. 36 At some point, and likely soon, the Court
will need to address this issue head on. So far, the Court has deftly
sidestepped the issue. This term, the Supreme Court has decided to hear a
case involving a web designer who refuses to design any website that
shows or advertises same-sex weddings. 37 The web designer additionally
desires the right to place her objection on her business materials. Her
objection is based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The web designer
cannot, due to her faith, sanction same-sex marriage. She wants the right
to refuse to create any website relating to same-sex marriage regardless of

wrote a statement explaining that while they would not have voted to grant the petition, they had
concerns about elevating what they termed “a novel constitutional right”—same-sex marriage—”ov er
the religious liberty interests explicitly protected in the First Amendment.” Id.
33. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (explaining that imposing
on a church to retain an unwanted minister “intrudes upon more than a mere employment decisions.
Such action interferes with the internal governance of a church, depriving the church of control over
the selection of those who will personify its beliefs”). Id.
34. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066
(2020) (broadly describing the ministerial function to include teachers who are tasked with teaching
religious doctrine, pray with, and attend religious services with their students).
35. Id. at 2060.
36. See, e.g., 303 Creative, LLC v. Elenis, 6 F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2021).
37. 303 Creative, 6 F.4th 1160, cert. granted in part, U.S.S.Ct., 2022 WL 515867 (Feb. 22,
2022).
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the sexual identity of the customer. 38 She will refuse to help a wedding
vendor that wants to market to same-sex couple regardless of whether that
vendor is LGBTQ. 39 The web designer’s objection is to the ceremony,
which she alleges violates her faith and speech rights, not the individuals
seeking service. Like the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop, she will do
business with LGBTQ individuals. She simply will not perform any
services that relate to same-sex weddings. Will the Court provide a brightline answer regarding public accommodations laws under this fact
scenario? It seems unlikely.
The Supreme Court’s decision to accept the case is intriguing. The
Court refused the web designer’s request to rule on her religious liberty
claims. 40 But the Court will consider her First Amendment speech rights
in being forced to create a website (speech) for consumers and being
required to keep silent about her objections. 41 The Court opted for a
narrow assessment of the case, once again delaying direct consideration
of the religious liberty issue. The frequent occurrence of these iterations
pitting religious liberty against LGBTQ equality of access to public goods
and services mandates a clear demarcation of whose right prevails. The
Supreme Court’s limited consideration of 303 Creative merely delays the
inevitable.
A religious activities/secular products solution would clarify that
religiously grounded businesses, like Hobby Lobby or Masterpiece
Cakeshop, must yield to public accommodations laws that require all
business performing secular functions to offer goods and services without
discrimination. 42 The religious services/secular products divide finds
support in other cases involving Title VII employment and taxation cases.
Outside the narrow ministerial exception, secular businesses with more
than 15 employees cannot fire or refuse to hire an individual due to their
LGBTQ status. 43 And religiously affiliated schools that choose to
discriminate lose their charitable tax status even when their student

38. 303 Creative, 6 F.4th at 1170.
39. Id.
40. 303 Creative, 6 F.4th 1160, cert. granted in part, U.S.S.Ct, 2022 WL 515867 (Feb. 22,
2022).
41. Id. The Supreme Court granted the petition “limited to the following question: Whether
applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”
42. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573
US 682 (2014) (holding Religious Freedom Restoration Act allows for-profit company to deny
employees health care coverage for contraception based on religious liberty of owners).
43. See Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding
that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies” Title VII).
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conduct policies are grounded in their theology. 44 Education, even
religiously based education, must yield to full and fair access to the
education setting if schools want to receive charitable tax status. 45
The Supreme Court’s recent decision, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 46 underscores the Court’s discomfort with the current test
for resolving religious liberty questions. In 1980, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith 47 held that religiously neutral,
generally-applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment. This means
that laws that do not target religion and apply generally to all equally are
constitutional. 48 The earlier example of a priest speeding to get to church
provides one example. Speeding laws are religiously neutral and apply
generally to all. Another example is the outlawing of peyote
consumption—the issue in Smith. 49 The purpose of outlawing peyote
consumption was deemed to be religiously neutral and applied to all. 50
Thus, there was no First Amendment violation. 51 At least three Justices
noted their displeasure with Smith’s test in Fulton and indicated their
willingness to overturn Smith. 52 Justice Coney Barrett, joined by Justice
Kavanaugh, expressed discomfort but was reluctant to retreat from Smith
without having an adequate substitute. 53 For now, Smith remains the
governing test for lower courts. And because the Supreme Court limited
consideration of 303 Creative’s challenge to free speech, Smith’s fate
awaits another day, another case.
The religious activities/secular products solution embraces Smith and
argues for its retention. But this proposed solution is more focused. If
courts were to focus on the religious nature of the underlying activity,
many would receive greater protection. In fact, Smith comes out
differently under the religious activities/secular products test. The Smith
44. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the IRS can
withdraw tax exempt status to religiously affiliated school that prohibits interracial dating).
45. Id. at 604. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority stated that “[d]enial of tax benefits
will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of religious schools, but will not prevent
those schools from observing their religious tenets.” Id.
46. 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
47. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48. Id. at 878-79. Justice Scalia wrote, “We have never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct the State is free
to regulate.” Id.
49. Id. at 874.
50. Id. at 882 (finding no evidence that Oregon’s drug laws were an attempt to regulate religious
beliefs).
51. Id. at 890.
52. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Smith and its
“severe holding is ripe for reexamination”).
53. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“Yet what should replace Smith?”).
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plaintiffs were literally exercising their right to worship in a manner that
did not harm others. They were engaging in a religious ceremony. In
contrast, the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop engages in a secular activity
when he bakes a cake. 54 This is not to diminish the baker’s sincerely held
religious beliefs. But the act of baking a cake holds no religious
ceremonial value. It is a secular activity.
We live in a pluralistic society that requires we interact with others
whose beliefs we may find unfamiliar or even offensive. But to claim that
every commercial action that one takes in a business role qualifies for First
Amendment protection pushes religious liberty rights beyond their
intended purposes. The Framers did not intend for religion to be an allpurpose shield. 55 The Framers intended religious liberty to be a protection
for theological beliefs and worship—not consumer transactions. 56
The religious activities/secular products approach would allow
businesses to choose what they serve versus who they serve. For example,
if a florist does not want to arrange flowers for a wedding because her
sincerely held religious beliefs only permit her to sell products to certain
couples, she can refuse to do any weddings. This approach allows the
business owner to preserve her religious identity while requiring her to
engage in commercial activities available to all on equal terms. Cakes are
not inherently religious. Flowers are not inherently religious. These items
can be used in religious ceremonies. But the item’s use does not transform
the product’s nature. Cakes and flowers are secular.
The religious activities/secular products distinction emphasizes the
secular nature of commercial transactions. It provides clarity and ensures
consistency among states and businesses. It allows businesses to decide
for themselves what they want to sell and the ways in which they want to
serve the public. If a business sells wedding cakes, wedding cakes must
be available to all couples on equal terms. If a person is in the wedding
photography business, she cannot turn customers away that want their
wedding filmed. This proposed test fulfils the promise of antidiscrimination laws while preserving the Framer’s First Amendment
purpose. It separates worship rights and protections from secular
commercial activities. This solution, while not perfect, allows Americans
54. This essay does not address other potential First Amendment protections for businesses,
such as free speech and expression rights.
55. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 722
(1981)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(“[T]he Court today reads the Free Exercise Clause more broadly
than is warranted”).
56. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)(noting “the freedom to act, even when
the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative
restrictions”).
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to live, and work, in a pluralistic society that grants equal access to nonreligious goods and services.
A society where one’s theology becomes the driving force in the
marketplace would dramatically undermine public accommodations laws.
Theological economics impose the seller’s religious values on consumers
through access–or lack thereof. For example, Catholic business owners
might begin selling products based on theology. Catholic business owners
might not feel comfortable selling products to divorcees. A Catholic
pharmacist might not be willing to sell birth control to anyone, or only to
their customers with proof of heterosexual marriage. 57 And, even then, the
pharmacist might only comply upon proof that this is the individual’s
first–and only–marriage. The Catholic baker may refuse to bake a
wedding cake for a person’s second marriage. Likewise, Muslim drivers
might refuse to take their Uber customers to certain venues or refuse to
accept riders that have been drinking or are carrying alcohol. 58 These
drivers might refuse to pick up certain individuals, such as females
traveling alone. The marketplace disruptions become more problematic
once individuals outside minority groups become burdened. If we tolerate
a theological approach to our economy, everyone becomes vulnerable to
the seller or provider’s individual beliefs.
A person’s access to secular products should not be dependent on the
seller’s theological views about the buyer. We cannot afford to return to a
world with signs hanging in businesses that indicate certain “others” are
not allowed. We should reject the idea that people entering a business can
be turned away because something about a consumer offends the person
providing secular, transactional services to the public. Even the thought is
57. See e.g. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016)(Alito, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, wrote a strong dissent focusing on the business’s right to refuse to stock emergency
contraceptives based on religious beliefs. Stormans, doing business as Ralph’s pharmacy, would not
provide the prescription but would send customers to other pharmacies. Justice Alito’s dissent
emphasized that alternative pharmacies were only two miles away. The dissent focused on the
religious beliefs of the pharmacy and pharmacists.
58. See e.g. Dolal, et al. v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, No. A07-1657, 2008 WL
4133517 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008)(unpublished decision). Several Muslim taxi drivers refused
to pick up airport passengers that were carrying alcohol. The MAC, which licenses cab drivers,
threatened to suspend the drivers’ taxi licenses if they refused to pick up passengers. Plaintiffs sought
an injunction against being required to pick up all passengers, alleging that carrying passengers with
alcohol violates their religious beliefs. The drivers lost their challenge. This case, and many like it,
show the diversity of faith rules that could govern a theologically focused economy. While each
individual issue might not be problematic—you can take the next cab or drive to the next pharmacy—
the cumulative effects of a theological economy could make daily living quite unpredictable. One
would never be able to know, upon entering a business, whether they would be able to secure the
services provided.
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discomforting. Keeping secular activities secular enables all to enjoy the
free market economy. If I am the only gay person living in a small town,
there might not be multiple wedding venues, bakers, florists, or
photographers. If I am a woman in need of birth control, I shouldn’t have
to drive to multiple pharmacies to get my prescription filled. Prices may
increase at the alternate location. Under this system, sooner or later all
Americans will be turned away for some secular service. Brown v. Board
of Education’s promise of equal access ensures that a person shouldn’t
have to find another baker, florist, or pharmacist if the business they
entered provides secular services to the public. Returning to the days of
unequal access will open a Pandora’s Box of theological objections.
This religious activities/secular products solution may seem to favor
the consumer over business owners with sincerely held religious beliefs.
But this is not an accurate depiction. Religious business owners can
continue to espouse their beliefs, center their operating hours around
worship and prayer, and even change seasonal menus based on religious
holidays. Yet when the business owner accepts the many advantages of
earning revenue through a public business, that business must serve the
public—all of it—without discrimination. To allow businesses to pick and
choose their clientele based on theological tests will revert the
marketplace to bygone days where some were “others” kept on the
outside. The First Amendment does not require this. Case law does not
support this. And history shows the danger of it.

